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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KAREN ANDERSON STUCKI,

)

Plaintiff and Appellant, )
Case No. 14563
vs.

)

FRANKLIN S. STUCKI,

)

Defendant and Respondent.)

RESPONDENTS BRIEF

Appeal from the Judgment of the Fifth Judicial District Court
for Iron County, Honorable J. Harlan Burns, Judge, Presiding.

MICHAEL W. PARK
110 North Main Street
Cedar City], Utah 84720
Attorney for Defendant

PATRICK H. FENTON
13 West Hoover Avenue
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Attorney for Plaintiff
Plaintiff/Appellant

FILE
NOV 3 - 1 9 7 6
Clork, Suproma Court, Utah
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KAREN ANDERSON STUCKI,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 14563

FRANKLIN S. STUCKI,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Respondent and appellant were divorced in Iron County
on the 22nd day of May, 1973.

Thereaftet on the 19th day of

March, 1976, Appellant filed a Motion for Modification of Interlocutory Decree of Divorce.

Said Motion was denied.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COl^RT
The lower Court denied the Motion of Appellant for
Modification of the Interlocutory Decree of Divorce.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the decision of the lower
Court affirmed.

-2STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were divorced by the Honorable J.
Harlan Burns and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Interlocutory Decree of Divorce were signed on May, 22, 1973.
At that time the Court found that the Appellant
suffered from a heart ailment of considerable extent and had
impaired health.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

para. 7).
The duration of the marriage was eight years; no
children were born as issue of said marriage and the property
awarded to the defendant was accumulated by him prior to the
time of the marriage.
Plaintiff was awarded the sum of $12,000.00, payable
at the rate of $300.00 per month in lieu of a property settlement.

(Conclusions of Law, para. 2).
Defendant made the $300.00 payments regularly and

on time and at the conclusion of the payments, plaintiff made
her motion to extend the payments alleging a change of circumstances .
At the time of the divorce the defendant was working
for the Department of Employment Security, earning $750.00 per
month take home pay.

(TR. 32). At the time of the Hearing for

modification the defendant was retired ahd was earning only
$57.40 per month V.A. compensation and defendant was not receiving
retirement.

(Court Proceeding 7).

If defendant chose to receive

retirement from the state he would have received approximately

-3one-third (1/3) less than the amount he was receiving at the
time of his divorce.

(Court Proceeding $).

At the time of the divorce, plaintiff was not working
and the doctor testified that she might not even be able to
hold down a part-time job,

(TR. 7). Only after cross-examination

did the doctor say that a part-time job might be a possibility
(TR. 9) and the entire testimony of the doctor lends itself to
the opinion that the plaintiff was not si^ited for work at the
time of the divorce.

The plaintiff responded to questions on

pages 20 and 21 of the transcript as follows:
Q.

Did you hear the doctor testify that
if you had a job that you didn't
exercise yourself too much you could
work it maybe three or fouir hours a
day?

A.

I feel like a person themselves have
to judge the capacity to which they
can go to and I feel like 1 can't do
anything.

Q.

You don't want to work, do you?

A. No.
At the time of the Modification Hearing plaintiff was not working.
At the time of the divorce, plaintiff did not have
income in addition to that provided by defendant and at the
time of the modification hearing, plaintilff did not have additional
income.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF
DECREE OF DIVORCE.

-4In the absence of changed conditions or circumstances,
the district court cannot modify a decree of divorce.
v. Hamilton, 89 U. 554, 58 P.2d 11 (1936).

Hamilton

There must be a

change in the circumstances or condition of a party since the
entry of the original decree.
P.2d 1211 (1952).

Dixon v. iDixon, 121 U. 259, 240

The change in circumstances must be substantial.

Gale v. Gale, 123 U. 277, 258 P.2d 986 (1953).
The Appellant must plead and prove a substantial change
in circumstances in order to prevail.

Plaintiff was not working

at the time of the divorce or at the time the motion for modification was made.

Plaintiff had the same income at the time of

the divorce as she did at the time of the motion for modification.
Defendant was working at the time of the divorce and was retired
at the time of the motion for modification, making substantially
less income.
The defendant has less income with which to pay and
the plaintiff does not need any more than she needed at the time
of the divorce.
Plaintiff points to the fact that she may not inherit.
There was no evidence in the transcript that she would inherit
at the time of the divorce.
Plaintiff states that the doctor stated she could
work at the time of the divorce and cannot now work.

The doctor

did not testify when the motion for modification hearing took
place and his previous testimony at time of trial leads one to
the conclusion that he was of the opiniott that she could not
work at the time of the divorce.
These two items did not lead the district court to the

-5conclusion that a substantial change of circumstances existed.
The attorney for the appellant affirmatively states that there
is no question that it is a discretionary item for the trial
court to determine whether a material change of circumstances
has taken place.

The case cited by the attorney for Plaintiff,

Ridge v. Ridge, 542 P.2d 189 (1975), also concludes that the
Supreme Court will not disturb the decision of the trial judge
unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
The appellant did not sustain its burden of showing
a material change of circumstances as required by decisions
pronounced by this Court.

Thr Trial Judge followed those

decisions and a clear abuse of the discretion of that ruling
has not been shown.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

MICHAEL W. PARK
Attorney for Respondent

